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Abstract 
The paper highlights the relevance of the game theoretic concept of the core of a cooper­
ative game for the design of international treaties on transfrontier pollution. Specifically, 
a formula is offered for allocating abatement costs between the countries involved for 
which the justification is of core-theoretic nature. The analysis emphasizes the strategic 
role of monetary transfers among the countries. 
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A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of 
Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution* 
Parkash Chander Henry Tulkens 
1 Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to highlight the relevance of the game theoretic concept of 
the core of a cooperative game for the design of international treaties on transfrontier 
pollution. Specifically, a formula is offered (in Section 5) for allocating abatement costs 
between the countries involved for which the justification is of core-theoretic nature. 
We develop our arguments in the framework of the simplest model traditionally used 
for the economic analysis of such agreements (as e.g. in MALER 1989-93, HOEL 1992, 
BARRETT 1992, CARRARO and SINISCALCO 1993, d'ASPREMONT and GERARD­
VARET 1992.) Our claims proceed, however, from results presented with full technical 
details in a companion theoretical paper (CHANDER and TULKENS 1994, hereafter 
referred to as C&T94) , where use is made of a more general model expressed in terms of an 
Arrow-Debreu economy, initially formulated in TULKENS 1979 as well as in CHANDER 
and TULKENS 1992. In the latter paper, a cost sharing formula in the same spirit 
was presented, valid only for marginal adjustments in abatement. Here, the formula is 
extended to the global game. 
*Thanks are due to Karl Goran Maler for numerous fruitful discussions and his hospitality at the Beijer
Institute for Ecological Economics, Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm, during May-June 
1993. The first author is also grateful to California Institute of Technology for providing a stimulating 
environment for the completion of this work. This research is part of the Commission of the European 
Communities (DG XII) "Environmental Policy, International Agreements and International Trade," 
administered by Alistair Ulph through CEPR, London. 
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2 Transfrontier Pollution: The Economic Model and 
Its Associated Games 
2.1 The Basic Economic Model 
Currently, much of the economic analysis of international agreements on transfrontier 
pollution is based on a model whose components are the following: 
(i) N = { iji = 1, ... , n} , the set of countries concerned by the analysis, the countries
being n in number, each indexed by i; 
(ii) For each country i: 
(a) Quantities Ei � 0 of pollutants emitted by the economic agents of country i, 
per unit of time. Ei is a scalar if the analysis bears on one pollutant only, as
will be the case in the present paper. 1 
(b) Quantities Qi � 0 of ambient pollutants present in country i's environment,
per unit of time. As for the emissions, Qi is a scalar if only one pollutant is
considered; in an analysis with several pollutants it would be a vector. 
( c) A transfer function 
(1) 
where E = (E1, . . .  , En) , that describes the physical, chemical, and/or biolog­
ical processes whereby the amounts E of pollutant(s) emitted in all countries
get transformed into the quantities Qi of ambient pollutants present in country
i. This function is assumed to be nondecreasing in each of its arguments. The
fact that Qi is formulated here as being dependent on current emissions only
restricts the analysis to flow pollutants, as opposed to stock pollutants. 
( d) An abatement cost function, Ci ( Ei) , expressing the costs (monetary and pos­
sibly nonmonetary) incurred by the polluting agents of country i when their
aggregate emissions are restricted to the amount Ei· This function is assumed
to be decreasing (CI < 0), a property reflecting the natural assumption that
reducing emissions (i.e., abating) is costly. 
(e) A damage cost function Di( Qi) , expressing the costs (monetary as well as non­
monetary) incurred by the economic agents of country i as a result of the
ambient pollutants Qi they are exposed to. This function is assumed to be
nondecreasing ( n: � 0). 
(f) The total of abatement and damage costs 
Ji(E) = Ci(Ei) + Di( Qi) 
= Ci(Ei) + Di[Fi(E) ], (2) 
1 It would be an m-dimensional vector if the quantities of m different pollutants were considered.
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incurred by the country as a result of the joint pollutant emissions E of all
countries. Notice that the variables Ej, j =/:- i, that appear as arguments of the
function Ji are of the nature of an externality, exerted on country i by each
one of the countries j. 
(iii) Finally, the description of this international economy with pollution-henceforth 
summarily designated by the pair [N, (Ci, Di, Fi ) iEN]-is completed by identifying
a vector E* = ( E;, ... , E�) of optimal joint emissions by the n countries, optimality
being taken in the sense of minimizing the sum over all countries of both abatement 
and damage costs. E* is thus the solution of the optimization problem.
min J(E) , 
{E1, ... ,En} 
(3) 
2.2 The Associated Games 
Because of the nonexistence of a supranational authority endowed with sufficient coercive 
power to impose any emissions policy on the countries, the optimum just defined is only 
likely to be implemented on a voluntary basis, that is, in terms of joint actions that suit 
the interests of each one of the countries involved. 
This argument, which is by now classical, motivates the recourse to game theoretic 
concepts for finding out whether it is at all reasonable to expect that the optimum 
be achieved voluntarily by the parties. Indeed, the formulation of alternative games 
associated with the economic model introduces behavioral assumptions on the basis of 
which voluntary actions can be characterized. 
In this respect, the distinction offered by classical game theory between noncoopera­
tive and cooperative games is particularly relevant. This paper builds explicitly on such 
distinction (i) by characterizing as equilibria of a noncooperative game associated with the 
above economic model, national emission policies that only satisfy the objectives of each 
country; and (ii) by identifying with some solution concept for cooperative games (also 
associated with the economic model) policies that reflect actions taken in a coordinated 
way by either all the parties, or subsets of them. 
Formally, 
(i) A noncooperative game, defined by its players set N = {iii = 1, ... , n }, by the
sets Ti, i = 1, . . .  , n of strategies accessible to each of the players i, and by the payoffs
ui that the latter achieve-and henceforth denoted by the triplet [N, (Ti) iEN, (ui) iEN]-is 
associated with the economic model [N, (Ci, Di, Fi) iEN] by identifying the players set with
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the set of countries, by defining the strategy set of each country as Ti = { Ei I Ei 2: 0} 
(with possibly an upper bound Ef to be defined below) , and by defining each player's
payoff ui as the value -Ji of the function specified in (2) above.
(ii) A cooperative game (in characteristic function form and with transferable utility) , 
defined by its players set N = {iii = 1, . . .  , n} and the fllHCtion w (S) that associates with
every subset S of N a  number called the worth2 of S-and henceforth denoted by the pair 
[N, w]-is similarly associated with the economic model [N, (Ci, Di, Fi) iEN] by identifying
again the player set with the set of countries, and by defining the characteristic function 
as3 
(4) 
Thus the worth of each coalition S is determined by some strategy vector (Ei) iES 
adopted by the members of the coalition. However, remembering (1) , one notices that 
when S # N, this worth also depends upon the strategies (Ej)j�s adopted by the coun­
tries which are not members of S. As those have been left unspecified in our formulation 
of the function (4) , we shall have to return to this issue below when we deal in more 
detail with the cooperative game. 
2.3 Assumptions on the Economic and Ecological Components 
of the Model 
Precise results on voluntary behavior in this economic model can be obtained when some 
further assumptions are introduced on its components. Those we shall use-most of 
which are standard, but would deserve critical discussion-are the following: 
Assumption 1: For every (decreasing) abatement cost function Ci(Ei) , i = 1, . . .  , n ,  there
exists Ef > 0 such that
(5) 
Assumption 2: Vi, the function Ci(Ei) is strictly convex (i.e., C;' > 0) over the range
] 0, Ef [.
2or the payoff to coalition S. 
3In standard game theoretic models, payoffs, whether individual as in Ui or for coalitions as in w(S), 
are usually supposed to be maximized by the players. As the economic model used here associates costs 
only with its agents, maximizing payoffs for them amounts to minimizing costs. The Arrow-Debreu type 
of model used in C&T94 allows for payoffs to be directly defined on the utilities of the economic agents, 
more in line with usual practice. 
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Assumption 3: 'Vi, the transfer function Qi = Fi(E) is of the linear additive form
n 
Qi= LEj. (6) 
j=l 
Notice that this assumption implies that Qi = Qi V i, j E N, thus making the ambient
quantities of pollutant to have the characteri�tics of an international public good ( actu­
ally, of a public "bad") for the countries involved. 4 In view of Assumption 3, we shall 
often write, with some notational inconsistency, Di( Qi) as Di(E). 
Assumption 4: Vi, the (nondecreasing) damage cost function Di( Qi) is convex (D�' 2: O); 
it is strictly increasing (D� > 0) for at least some i. 
Together, Assumptions 2 to 4 imply that Vi, the total cost function Ji(E) is convex.
One can then prove, as in C&T94 (Section 3) : 
Proposition 1: Under the Assumptions 1-4, the optimal joint emissions vector E* is
unique and in the range] 0, Ef [ Vi. 
The optimum so defined is usefully characterized by the well-known first order con­
ditions 
n 
LD}(E*)+CI(E;)=O, i=l, . .. , n . (8) 
j=l 
3 The Noncooperative Game and Its Nash Equilib-
• r1a 
3.1 The Nash Equilibrium 
A first form of voluntary behavior in our economic model is the one described by the 
familiar Nash equilibrium concept of the associated noncooperative game, namely: 
Definition 1: For the noncooperative game [N, (Ti) iEN, (ui) iEN], a Nash equilibrium is a
joint strategy choice E = (E1, . . .  , En) such that Vi, Ei minimizes Ji(E) , where for each
4In MALER's 1989-93 acid rain game, where the linear transfer function is of the form 
n 
Qi= LaiiEj, 
j=l 
(7) 
with 0 ::; aji ::; 1 and LiEN aji = 1, the externalities are directional and do not have the public good
property. 
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Existence of this equilibrium follows from standard theorems (see e.g. FRIEDMAN
1990) . It is characterized by the first order conditions 
D�(E) + CI(Ei) = 0, i = 1, . . .  , n . (9) 
As these differ from the conditions (8) whereby the optimum was characterized, a 
Nash equilibrium is not an optimum for the economy, revealing thus that this form of 
voluntary behavior is incompatible with international optimality. 
Notice that the conditions (9) imply 
(10) 
Furthermore, if Di( Qi) is linear, Ei is a dominant strategy for i since the first term of
(9) is independent of Qi and of the vector E in that case.
A final property, formally important for our purposes below, is the uniqueness of the 
Nash equilibrium vector E in this game, as shown in Proposition 2 of C&T94.
3.2 Strong and Coalition-Proof Equilibria 
MA.LER 1989-93 has considered stronger concepts of voluntary behavior in the framework 
of noncooperative games, namely the "strong Nash equilibrium" and the "coalition-proof 
Nash equilibrium." However, for the game [N, (Ti) iEN, (ui) iEN], it can be shown that there
exists no strong Nash equilibrium, and no coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is optimal, if 
there exists one at all. They are therefore of little use in our enquiry. 
3.3 The Partial Agreement Nash Equilibrium With Respect 
to a Coalition 
Another aspect of the noncooperative behavior may be considered, namely the one 
adopted by the players outside a coalition, when a coalition forms. This is described 
by the following concept. 
Definition 2: Given some coalition S C N, a partial agreement equilibrium with 
respect to S in the game [N, (Ti) iEN, (ui) iEN], is a joint strategy E such that
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( i) ( Ei )iES minimizes I::iES Ji ( E), where for every j E N, j r/. S, Ej = Ej as defined in
( ii) , and 
(ii) Vj E N\S, Ej minimizes Jj(E), where for every i E S, Ei = Ei as defined in ( i) .
In C&T94 (Section 3.3) , we prove: 
Proposition 2. For any proper coalition S C  N in the game [N, (Ti)iEN, (ui)iEN], 
(i) there exists a partial agreement equilibrium with respect to S; 
(ii) the vector of individual emission levels at such an equilibrium is unique; 
(iii) the individual emissions of the players outside the coalition are not lower than those 
at a Nash equilibrium; 
(iv) the total emissions level is not higher than at a Nash equilibrium. 
The equilibrium so defined is also characterized by the first order conditions 
L Dj(E) + CI(Ei) 0, i ES 
jES 
Dj(E) + Cj(Ej) 0, j E N\S. (11) 
4 The Cooperative Game: Imputations, The Core 
and Alternative Characteristic Functions 
4.1 Imputations and the Core 
Turning now to the cooperative part of our analysis, we first recall some terminology. 
For a cooperative game [N, w] in general, an imputation is a vector y = (y1, ...  , Yn) such
that I::iEN Yi = w ( N) . Recall that for the game associated with our economic model,
the worth w ( N) of the grand coalition, as defined in ( 4) , is a total cost: more precisely,
it is the minimum of the aggregate total abatement and damage cost over all countries. 
Here, an imputation is thus a way to share among all players the amount of this cost. In 
this setting, an imputation y is said to belong to the core of the game if it satisfies the
conditions; 
LYi:::; w(S), VS c N.
iES 
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(12) 
The core of our cooperative game is thus the set of imputations having the property that 
to every conceivable coalition they offer to bear a share of the aggregate cost w(N) lower 
than the cost w(S), it would bear by itself. 
To study the core of this game, we therefore shall consider in more detail, in the next 
two subsections, what its imputations are, as well as how its characteristic function is 
precisely defined. 
4.2 Imputations in the Game and Monetary Transfers in the 
Economic Model 
As was noted in Proposition 1, the minimum aggregate cost is determined by a unique
joint strategy vector E* = (Er, ... , E�), yielding Ji (E*) for each i and of course LiEN Ji (E*) = 
w(N). The vector J (E*) = [J1 (E*), ... , Jn (E*)] is thus an imputation where each coun-
try bears itself the abatement and damage costs that E* entails for it.
Other imputations, associated with the same optimal joint strategy, can be conceived 
of, however, if monetary transfers between countries are introduced. Let us denote such 
transfers by Pi (> 0 if the transfer is paid by i, < 0 if it is received by it) . Then impu­
tations in the cooperative game associated with our economy can be written as vectors 
yP = (yf, ... , y�,) defined by
yf=Ji(E*)+Pi, i=l, . . .  , n , 
and the condition 
With the condition just stated, we have indeed that LiEN yf = w(N).
It was observed at the end of Subsection 2.2 that for arguments S =/= N of the char­
acteristic function associated with our economic model, the function involves variables 
that represent strategic choices made by players who are not members of S. Because of 
this feature-a typical one when a cooperative game is associated with economies with 
externalities, such as ours-the characteristic function ( 4) should specify explicitly what
the actions are both of the members of S and of the other players. To this effect, we 
shall consider the following two alternatives: 
( i) The cooperative game [N, wa], defined by the characteristic function of the form
wa (S) = min L Ji(E) where, if S =!= N, Ei = Ej V j E N\S. 
(Ei)iES iES 
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(Recall that EJ was defined in Assumption 1). 
This function reflects the assumption that when a coalition forms, its worth is what 
it gets when the players outside the coalition choose the strategy which is worst for 
it-i.e., pollute up to EJ in our model. 
This form has been often used in economic models with beneficial externalities 
and/or public goods production (see, e.g. FOLEY 1970, SCARF 1971, and re­
cently CHANDER 1993) where it is a natural one because the "worst" strategy of 
nonmembers of S is simply no action in such cases. 
With detrimental externalities as we have here, it is less natural to assume such an 
attitude: why should the nonmembers of S act in this way? And for the members 
of S, why should they necessarily expect the worst and behave in a minimax way? 
The first of these questions is also raised by MA.LER 1989-1993 in his discussion 
of cooperative games of transfrontier pollution, all the more rightly so that he does 
not assume in the economic model an upper bound such as our EJ for the individual 
emissiods. The worst then becomes infinite amounts of emissions, which is hardly 
credible. 
While Maler concludes by dismissing the tool of the characteristic function, and as 
a consequence the core concept which is built on it5, we choose to propose instead 
to consider the following alternative: 
(ii) The cooperative game [N, w1], defined by the characteristic function of the form 
w1(S) = min Ji(E) where, if S-::/= N, Ej = Ej"ij E N\S. 
(E;);ES 
(Recall that Ej was defined in part (ii) of the definition of a partial agreement 
equilibrium with respect to a coalition). 
The function w1 is to be called the "partial agreement" charactPristic function. \Ve 
assume here that when S forms, the other players break-up into singletons, and 
act noncooperatively so as to reach an equilibrium in their best individual interest, 
given S.
It is thus not assumed that they do the worst; nor is it assumed, as in the concepts 
of strong and coalition-proof equilibria, that they do not react6 to the actions of S. 
r'Anothcr argument ma.de .is that. wit.h no IH1u11ds on I.hp h!'lt1tl'iur of player�; not i11 S, tlw worth 
of coalitions different from N can be reduced to zero, which renders them powerless. The core then 
becomes equal to the set of imputations, and the concept brings no more information than optimality. 
6CARRARO and SINISCALCO 1993, in a model with identical agents, assume instead that when 
S forms and achieves the aggregate payoff w(S), if some i E S leaves S, the coalition S\{i} remains 
formed. (They show that then, it may be better for i to leave S; and as this ad,;antage grows with the 
size of coalitions, they conclude that only small coalitions can prevail, and N will never form). 
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In view of property (10) and of Proposition 2, one has that for each S, w1'(S) 2: wcx(S). 
This implies that the core of the game [N, w1'], i. e. , the "1-core" is, if nonempty, contained 
in the "a-core", and possibly smaller. 
5 An Imputation in the "1-Core" of the Coopera­
tive Game 
As it is well known that many cooperative games may have an empty core, the concept 
of a 1-core imputation is only useful if we can establish its existence, at least for the 
cooperative game [ N, w1'] that we have associated with the economic model. As far 
as the a-core is concerned, it was shown to be nonempty in games with externalities 
by SCARF 1971 as well as in the version given by LAFFONT 1977 (p. 102) of the
SHAPLEY and SHUBIK 1989 well-known "garbage game"7• 
We proceed in this section in a constructive way, that is, by exhibiting an imputa­
tion for which we show that it has the property of belonging to the 1-core. Economic 
interpretations are given in the next section. 
Our result is not fully general, though, as we obtain it only under two alternative 
additional assumptions: either linearity of the damage cost functions Di, or identical
abatement cost functions Ci for all countries i. We limit ourselves here to the first case,
and refer the reader to C&T94 for the second one. 
Theorem. Let E* = (Et, ... , E�) be the (unique) optimal joint emissions policy. Un­
der Assumptions 1-3 and the linearity of all the damage cost functions Di, the imputation
y* = (yr, ... , y�) defined by
where 
and 
Y7 = Ji(E*) +Pt, i = 1, . . .  , n ,
�* = -[Ci(E;) - Ci(.Ei)] + g,� [L Ci(E;) - L C(Ei)l
N iEN iEN 
D� = L D�, 
iEN 
(13) 
7Laffont also shows that for the garbage game, the emptiness claimed by Shapley and Shubik applies 
in fact to the /3-core. For a game like ours, the a-core and the /3-core coincide. 
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belongs to the core of the game [N, w"Y]. 
Proof (a) It is easily verified that y* is an imputation, i. e. , that
iEN iEN 
since LiEN Pt = 0.
(b) Suppose now that the imputation y* is not in the core. Then, there would exist
a coalition S and a partial agreement equilibrium with respect to S, E = (E1, .. . , En) , 
such that 
L Ji(E) < LYl-iES iES 
(14) 
Notice first that V i  E N\S, Ei = Ei in this partial agreement equilibrium because Ei is a
dominant strategy under linearity of the damage cost functions. Moreover, from the first 
order conditions that characterize a partial agreement equilibrium one has V i E S, Ei �
E;. 
Consider now the alternative imputation y defined by 
where the transfers are of the form 
pi = -[Ci(E;) - Ci(Ei)] + i� ["L Ci(E;) - L Ci(Ei)l 
N iEN iEN 
If we can show that 
and that 
(i) LYi < L Ji(E) iES iES 
(ii) L Yi� L y7, iEN\S iEN\S 
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then, given (14) , the imputation 'f) induces an aggregate cost for all countries which is
lower than w (N)-an impossibility that proves the theorem.
To show (i) , let us write
iES iES iES 
where the last line has been obtained by adding and subtracting LiES Di(E) to the
previous one, and use has been made of the linearity of the functions Di as well as . of
the form (6) of the transfer functions. In this expression, a negative value of the term 
within square brackets can be derived from properties of the optimum E*, of a partial
agreement equilibrium with respect to a coalition and from the strict convexity of the 
abatement cost functions Ci. 
To show (ii) , starting from the fact that
and 
Yi Ci(E;) + Di(E*) + Pi 
Ci(Ei) + Di(E*) + i� [L Ci(E;)
- L Ci(Ei)lN jEN iEN
Y7 Ci(E;) + Di(E*) + �* 
Ci(Ei) + Di(E*) + i� [L Ci(E;) - L Ci(Ei)lN jEN iEN
it is sufficient to show that 
< Ci(Ei) + i� [L Ci(E;) - L Ci(Ei)] , vi E N\S.N iEN iEN 
But this derives from the characterization of a partial agreement equilibrium with respect 
to a coalition with linear functions Di, namely Ei = Ei, a dominant strategy V i E N\S, 
and LiEN Ci(Ei) 2: LiEN Ci(Ei) according to Proposition 2. 
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Q. E.D. 
I 
Finally the remark made at the end of Section 4 allows us to further state: 
Corollary. The imputation y* also belongs to the core of the game [N, w0']. 
6 Conclusion: Economic Interpretation of the Pro­
posed "'Y-core" Solution. 
6.1 The Cost Sharing Formula 
As announced in the introduction, the essence of the paper is formula (13) , which specifies 
a (net) monetary transfer for each country. Its "core" virtue lies in the fact that, given
the international optimum E*, and the cost (both of abatement and of damage) Ji ( E*) 
that each country has to bear to implement it, the transfers yield to each country or 
group of countries an effective net cost lower than the one they would bear under any 
other arrangement, including under strictly autarkic Nash equilibrium. 
Each individual transfer consists of two parts: a payment to each country i that covers
its increase in cost between the Nash equilibrium and the optimum (first squared bracket
of formula (13) ) ,  and a payment by country i of a proportion DUD'rv of the total of
these differences across all countries (second squared bracket of formula (13) ) .  Of course,
full knowledge of the functions Di and Ci is required for computing these amounts. We
already had proposed elsewhere (CHANDER and TULKENS 1992) that an international
agency be set up to handle these computations and payments. Recall that as they are 
specified, the transfers break even. 
Notice that if D� = 0 for some country (because it would not be concerned as a
recipient-or would allege not to be-of the kind of transfrontier pollution under dis­
cussion) , while its abatement cost would be positive, that country only receives the first
component of the transfer formula, for the abatement it does; but it pays nothing to the 
others; this leaves it at an effective cost level equal to the one at the Nash equilibrium. 
In general, though, according to the second component of the formula, the contribu­
tion made by a country to the other ones is a fraction of the aggregate abatement costs 
(above the Nash equilibrium) equal to its relative marginal damage cost to the sum of all
countries' marginal damage costs, DU D'rv. In other words, each country's contribution
is determined by the relative intensity of its preferences for the public good component 
of the problem. 
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6.2 On the Cooperative and Voluntary Nature of Agreements 
Supported by Core Theoretic Considerations 
A core imputation is to be interpreted as a proposal made to all players for sharing 
w(N), having the property that no coalition S can improve upon it for the benefit of 
its members by means of the payoff it can secure them. Because of this property, it is 
claimed that no coalition S is in a position to object to it. 
A core proposal is thus ( i) a cooperative one, because it involves the all players set,
and ( ii) one that should entail voluntary agreement, because it is based on an explicit
proof that neither the absence of agreement, nor any other agreement can do better for 
any of the parties involved. 
These seem to be strong virtues for designing the cost sharing arrangements in an 
international treaty. 
6.3 On the Role of International Transfers 
The strategic role of monetary transfers appears clearly as soon as one realizes that 
polluting countries with nonzero abatement cost and weak preferences for removal of 
ambient pollutants never have an interest in cooperating towards abatement ( let alone
an optimal one) , because the costs are higher to them than the benefits. This is reflected,
by the way, in the two following remarks: (i) in our game, the core is empty in general
if transfers are not allowed; and (ii) when all players are identical, the (unique) core
imputation is the one without transfers. It is thus, in a sense, the diversity of the agents 
that commands transfers when strategic considerations are at stake. 
6.4 On the Linearity Assumption on the Damage Cost Func­
tion 
While restrictive at a general level, the linearity assumption on preferences (i.e., damage
costs) may be seen as a mild one in the specific context oftransfrontier pollution. On 
the one hand, at the empirical level, these functions are indeed extremely difficult to 
estimate. Mainly for that reason, MALER 1989-93 and several of his followers have been 
satisfied with that assumption, all the more that, as he shows, it can be given a useful 
role in a Nash equilibrium situation. 
Another argument is that the optimum may lie far away from the situation prevail­
ing at the time the negotiations begin, thereby increasing uncertainties. Techniques of 
economic computation have therefore been devised to move towards the optimum in suc­
cessive steps (a recent example is given in GERMAIN, TOINT and TULKENS 1994). 
For the "local" information required to apply these techniques, linear functions (with
parameters possibly varying over time) are surely not inappropriate.
14 
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